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Introduction
In the wake of the landmark Civil Rights Act of 1964, an act which protected minorities
and women from employment discrimination but did not prohibit discrimination based on age,
1
Congress enacted the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (hereinafter "ADEA"). 2
This act prohibits an employer from taking actions which "would deprive or tend to deprive any
individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee,
because of such individual's age."3 At first glance, this statutory prohibition would seem to be
very similar to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 4 and indeed the language in the ADEA
matches the language in Title VII as to employment discrimination.5 However, a key difference
exists that makes proving an age discrimination case significantly more difficult than proving a
Title VII case. The "reasonable factors other than age" (hereinafter "RFOA") provision of the
ADEA,6 as well as the qualitative differences between age discrimination and other forms of
discrimination,7 raises a significant question as to whether the ADEA should be judicially
interpreted in the same way as Title VII.
1 Smith v. City of Jackson, 125 S.Ct. 1536, 1540 (2005).
2 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (2000).
' 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(2) (2000).
4 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(2) (2000).
' Compare 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(2)(2000), with 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(2)(2000).
6 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(1) (2000).
7 See REPORT OF THE SECRETARY OF LABOR TO THE CONGRESS UNDER SECTION 715 OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS AcT oF 1964, THE
OLDER AMERICAN WORKER: AGE DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT 5 (1965). The report, which is the foundation for the
ADEA, claimed that age discrimination, as opposed to other forms of discrimination, generally does not result from
animosity towards the victims of the discrimination, but rather from a belief that the elderly are less productive.
Also, unlike most other forms of discrimination, the discriminating factor at issue, age, very often does have an
impact on productivity.
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On March 30, 2005, the U.S. Supreme Court issued a 5-3 decision (Justice Rehnquist did
not participate) in the case of Smith v. City of Jackson, a case in which the court was called upon
to determine whether the ADEA should be interpreted in a way similar to Title VII. 8 The Court
answered in the affirmative regarding the question of disparate impact policies in employment,
holding that disparate impact theory can provide a cause of action in ADEA cases, just as it does
in Title VII cases.9 While the court rejected the plaintiffs' age discrimination claim in Smith,1" its
decision could prove to be favorable to ADEA plaintiffs in the long term. After a discussion of
disparate impact theory, this casenote will examine the arguments for and against allowing
ADEA claims under disparate impact theory and will analyze whether the court's decision was
proper and whether it will have a significant impact on age discrimination cases in the future.
I. What is Disparate Impact Theory?
A key problem that can arise in discrimination cases is the difficulty inherent in proving
intent to discriminate. A policy may disproportionately affect a legally protected group, such as a
racial, gender, or age group, but this does not necessarily mean that the policy is illegal.11 Rather,
the Supreme Court has drawn a line between intent-centered dejure segregation, which is
generally illegal, and results-centered defacto segregation, which is generally not illegal.12
8 125 S.Ct. 1536 (2005).
9Id. at 1544 (referring to Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971)).
1 Id. at 1540.
See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 238-41 (1976) (holding that although it is possible for a facially-neutral
policy to be discriminatory if it is applied "invidiously," the results of a policy are insufficient to prove
discrimination); Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 372-73 (2001) (holding that disparate
impact in racial discrimination cases is evidence of discrimination, but generally does not stand on its own); see also
Vill. Of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 270-71 (1977) (holding that facially-neutral
policy did not violate the Constitution); e.f Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 373-74 (1886) (holding that facially-
neutral policy was "so unequal and oppressive as to amount to a practical denial by the state of [an] equal protection
of the laws").
12 See Davis, 426 U.S. at 240; see also Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 549 (2004) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting)
(arguing that disparate impact should apply to Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act, resulting in greater
protections than the anti-discrimination protections of the Fourteenth Amendment, suggesting that disparate impact
in other contexts, including the ADEA, might be broader than the Fourteenth Amendment).
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Further, the courts have stated that certain policies are acceptable despite having been
intentionally designed with the knowledge that they will disproportionately affect groups of
people, most notably affirmative action programs.13
Disparate impact can be viewed as a vehicle used by the plaintiff to argue that a facially
non-discriminatory policy is, nonetheless, illegal. At first glance, it may simply seem to be the
means by which the plaintiff argues that a policy is being applied "invidiously," so as to turn a
de facto discrimination case like Village ofArlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp.'4 into a
dejure discrimination case like Yick Wo v. Hopkins. 5 Disparate impact would have little
importance in the latter context.16
However, Griggs v. Duke Power Co.,17 upon which Smith heavily relies, reveals that
disparate impact is a valuable instrument for the plaintiff, at least in the context of Title VII
employment claims.18 Cases like Yick Wo, Bollinger, and Bakke dealt largely with equal
protection claims.19 In Griggs, the Supreme Court used Title VII to overturn an employer's
requirement that his employees pass a general intelligence test or possess a high school
education, a policy which disproportionately affected black workers, reasoning that the
requirements were not substantially related to job performance.20 The Court held that even if the
policy was neutral in terms of intent, it could still be overturned as disproportionately harming
members of a protected group because the requirements of the policy were not substantially
13 See e.g. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003); Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
The key to an affirmative action program passing a constitutional test in the school admissions setting appears to be
that the program must be narrowly tailored to achieve the goal of an improved educational setting through the
creation of a more diverse student body, as opposed to being designed with the intention of discriminating against a
class of people. Disproportionate impact may be overcome by a legally protected goal.
14 429 U.S. 252.
15 118 U.S. 356.
16 See supra, note 11.
17 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
18 Id.
19 Yick Wo, 118 U.S. 356; supra, note 13.
20 Griggs, 401 U.S. at 431-32.
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related to job performance.21 The intent aspect is especially interesting, as it suggests that Title
VII goes farther than Washington v. Davis22 in rooting out discrimination, as even certain forms
of defacto discrimination may be impermissible under Title VII. Further, Griggs allows for the
possible use of disparate impact to shift the burden of proof onto the employer to show why the
policy is justified, after the plaintiff has shown that the policy disproportionately affects the
group of which he or she is a member. This makes disparate impact a very powerful tool for the
plaintiff.
II. Background of Smith v. City of Jackson
The disparate impact discrimination claim that arose in Smith was based on a pay raise
policy for police officers in Jackson, Mississippi.23 In 1999, the city adopted a plan that would
give proportionately higher raises to officers having less than five years experience, in an attempt
to bring the salaries of recently hired police officers up to the regional average.24 Though the pay
raise discrepancy was based upon years of experience rather than age specifically, the result of
the city's policy was that on average, older officers tended to receive smaller raises than younger
workers.25 The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals rejected the plaintiff police officers' disparate
impact argument, holding that Title VII disparate impact theory cannot be used in claims arising
under the ADEA.26
III. The Majority Opinion
A. Use of Griggs - The ADEA is to be Interpreted Similarly to Title VII
21 Id. at 431.
22 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
23 Smith v. City of Jackson, 125 S.Ct. 1536, 1539 (2005).
24 1d.
25 Id..
26 Smith v. City of Jackson, 351 F.3d 183, 187-95 (5th Cir. 2003).
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In beginning its justification of why disparate impact theory can be used in ADEA
claims, the majority turned to the Griggs case." As previously stated, Griggs allows for the use
of disparate impact in Title VII cases.28 The majority noted that the relevant ADEA section
mirrors the language in Title VII.29 As a result, the ADEA's language that matches Title VII
must be interpreted in the same manner as Title VII, and indeed Smith did not represent the first
case where the court has so held.3" Therefore, the majority concluded that the precedent set forth
in Griggs that disparate impact claims can be brought under Title VII applies to ADEA cases as
well.31
B. Prior Case Law Supports Allowing Disparate Impact Claims
The majority pointed out that many lower courts had previously accepted disparate-
impact claims falling under the ADEA,32 and only after Hazen Paper v. Biggins33 was such a
policy thrown into doubt.3" In Hazen Paper, the court rejected a lawsuit that was filed by
Biggins, an employee who had been terminated just before his pension would have vested.35 The
Supreme Court, in rejecting Biggins' disparate impact claim, pointed out that he was not fired
because of his age, but rather because his years of service would soon entitle him to a pension.36
27 Smith, 125 S.Ct. at 1541-43.
28 Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 436 (1971).
29 Smith, 125 S.Ct. at 1540 (holding that the only difference between § 703(a)(2) of The Civil Rights Act of 1964
and the wording of the relevant ADEA section quoted above is replacement of the words "race, color, religion, sex,
or national origin," with the word "age"); see also Smith, 125 S.Ct. at 1544 n. 11 (noting the difference in language
between the ADEA and the Equal Pay Act of 1963); 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1) (barring recovery in sex discrimination
cases if "any factor other than sex" justifies a pay differential, as opposed to the ADEA, which deals only with
reasonable factors) (emphasis added).
3" See, e.g., Trans World Airlines v. Thurston, 469 U.S. 111, 121 (1985).
31 Smith, 125 S.Ct. at 1542-43.
32 Id. at 1443 n.8; see, e.g., Maresco v. Evans Chemetics, 964 F.2d 106, 115 (2d Cir. 1992); Monroe v. United Air
Lines, 736 F.2d 394, 404 n.3 (7th Cir. 1984).
33 507 U.S. 604 (1993).
34 Smith v. City of Jackson, 125 S.Ct. at 1543.
3 Hazen Paper, 507 U.S. at 612-13.36 1d. at 612.
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A firing for the latter reason was not held to be illegal under the ADEA.37 The majority in Hazen
Paper was not rejecting the general use of disparate impact in ADEA claims. Rather, the
problem in the case was that the claim did not arise as a result of Biggins' age, but instead arose
because of a factor logically correlated with age: his years of service.38 The majority in Hazen
Paper explained that "[d]isparate treatment... captures the essence of what Congress sought to
prohibit in the ADEA."39
C. Executive Agency Interpretation of the ADEA Supports Allowing Disparate Impact
Claims
1. The Majority View - Executive Agency Interpretation as Persuasive Evidence of
the Correct ADEA Interpretation
The majority in Smith v. City of Jackson noted that both the Department of Labor, which
drafted the ADEA, and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (hereinafter "EEOC"),
which implements it, approve of the use of disparate impact claims under the ADEA.4 ° The
majority did not note that it was giving Chevron41 deference to the executive agencies,42 though
perhaps it did not feel that such deference was necessary given the other factors that justified
allowing disparate impact claims. The majority, however, may have used agency interpretations
to bolster its case. The majority concedes that agency interpretations do not mention disparate
37 Id. Biggins was sixty-two at the time. The relevant factor for him being fired, however, was not his age but the
fact that he was nearing ten years of service to the company, at which time his pension would have vested. In
support of this conclusion, the majority noted that the company even offered, as an alternative to termination, to
have Biggins transferred to a consulting position, a job which would not have maintained his pension status.
38 Id. Firing Biggins in this manner was still prohibited by other law, notably the Employee Retirement Income
Security Act of 1974, 29 U.S.C. § 1140. The ADEA is concerned with age, not experience. Note the similarity
between the fact patterns in Hazen Paper Co. and Smith, which also deals with experience, as opposed to age.39 Id. at 610 (1993).
40 Smith v. City of Jackson, 125 S.Ct. 1536, 1544 (2005).
41 Chevron v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984) (holding that the courts must show deference to
agency interpretations of statutes when those interpretations are reasonable and not contrary to the law or the
Constitution).
42 Smith, 125 S.Ct. at 1544.
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impact by name.43 However, regulations implementing the ADEA do suggest support for
disparate impact claims by stating, for example, that when an employer attempts to use the
defense that a reasonable factor other than age (RFOA) justifies a facially neutral policy that
nonetheless tends to discriminate based on age, the employer bears the burden of proving the
existence of that factor.44
2. The Scalia concurrence - Use of Chevron
Justice Scalia's concurrence, while supporting most of the other points raised by the
majority, focuses heavily on agency interpretation of the ADEA.45 It appears that agency
interpretation of the ADEA is enough to settle the matter for him.46 Justice Scalia emphasizes
regulations promulgated under the ADEA that were also emphasized by the majority. 47 He also
notes that in prior cases, the EEOC has appeared to defend its position that the ADEA allows for
disparate impact claims.48 In this aspect of the opinion, Justice Scalia's concurrence drifts from
the majority. As noted above, the majority did not signal that it was prepared to give Chevron
deference to the opinions of executive agencies that appeared to support the use of disparate
impact claims in ADEA cases. 49 Rather, the majority opinion merely used those agency
positions as evidence supporting its decision.5" Justice Scalia's opinion, however, places
significantly more importance on the opinions of the agencies, suggesting perhaps that those
interpretations would be sufficient, standing alone, to reach a decision in this case.51
43 Id.
44 29 C.F.R. § 1625.7(e) (2005). This burden of proof suggests both that a policy being facially neutral is not
sufficient to make it legal and that a disparate impact claim can be used to shift the burden of proof to the employer
in a case involving a facially neutral policy. Both of these results eliminate the very difficult requirement of proving
actual intent to discriminate.
45 Smith, 125 S.Ct. at 1546-49 (Scalia, J., concurring).
46 Id.
47 Id (discussing 29 C.F.R. § 1625.7(d) (2005)).48 Id. at 1547 (Scalia, J., concurring) (citations omitted).
49 Id. at 1544 (majority opinion).50 Id.
51 Smith v. City of Jackson, 125 S.Ct 1536, 1546 (2005) (Scalia, J., concurring) ("This is an absolutely classic case
for [Chevron] deference to agency interpretation.").
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D. The RFOA Provision of the ADEA Does Not Preclude the Use of Disparate Impact
Claims
A principal difference between Title VII and the ADEA is the existence in the ADEA of
the "Reasonable Factors Other than Age" (RFOA) provision.52 This provision permits otherwise
illegal discriminatory policies where the policies are based on reasonable factor(s) other than
age.53 This means that even if a policy tends to harm members of a certain age group, it can still
be permitted under the ADEA if there are other reasonable justification(s) for the policy.54 This
element of the ADEA understandably leads to confusion about whether disparate impact claims
should be allowed under the ADEA.
One interpretation of Hazen Paper is that only two types of policies which may harm
members of a certain age group exist: one where there is illegal discrimination against members
of a certain age group (disparate treatment discrimination) and another where the policy is
facially neutral on the question of age but tends to disproportionately harm members of an age
group during implementation (disparate impact discrimination).55 Any policy that cannot be
justified by a reasonable factor other than age immediately falls into the first category, making
policies that fall into the second category legally permissible." At this point, disparate impact is
not needed. Any policy that harms members of an age group and is not justifiable on other
grounds is illegal, without the need to resort to disparate impact.57 Such a policy is not facially
neutral, meaning that disparate impact does not come into play.58
52 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(1) (2000).
53 Id.
54 Smith, 125 S.Ct. at 1544 (majority opinion).
55 Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604, 609-10 (1993).
56 See id.; Smith, 125 S.Ct. 1536.57 Hazen Paper Co., 507 U.S. at 609.58 Id. at 610.
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The majority in Smith, however, concluded that the RFOA provision does not logically
eliminate the availability of disparate impact claims. 9 Rather than concluding that Hazen Paper
was decided with regard to the RFOA provision, the majority rejected the argument that the
RFOA provision and disparate impact played any role in Hazen Paper.6" Hazen Paper thus
stands for the proposition that it is possible for a policy to be permissible in an ADEA case
without resorting to the RFOA provision.61 Such a policy would not violate the ADEA because
it targets factors other than age.62 The RFOA provision then becomes a last line of defense for
the party accused of discrimination.
IV. The Dissenting Opinion
A. The Language of the ADEA Does Not Support Disparate Impact Claims
In her dissent, Justice O'Connor argues against allowing disparate impact claims under
the ADEA by focusing on the "because of such individual's age" language contained within it.63
The dissent argues that this language must imply some purposeful discrimination.64 A clear
distinction exists between policies which intend to discriminate based upon age and those which
indirectly and disproportionately affect members of a certain age group. 5 The policies in the
second group are not designed "because of' an employee's age.66 In interpreting the language of
59 Smith, 125 S.Ct. at 1544.
" Id.; see also Kenneth R. Davis, Age Discrimination and Disparate Impact: A New Look at an Age-old Problem, 70
BROOK. L. REv. 361, 372-73 (2005) (quoting Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604, 610 (1993) ("[W]e have
never decided whether a disparate impact theory of liability is available under the ADEA, and we need not do so
here.") (citations omitted)).
61 Smith, 125 S.Ct. at 1544 (quoting Hazen Paper, 507 U.S. at 609 ("[T]here is no disparate treatment under the
ADEA when the factor is some feature other than the employee's age.")).
62 Id.
63 Smith, 125 S.Ct. at 1549-50 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1)-(2) (2000)) (emphasis
removed).
64 Id. In International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n. 15 (1977), the Court seems to
agree with Justice O'Connor by stating that, in disparate impact cases, "[p]roof of discriminatory motive is critical."
However, the Court goes on to state that the discriminatory motive "can sometimes be inferred from the mere fact of
differences in treatment" (emphasis added).65 Id.; Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971).
66 Id at 1549-50.
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the ADEA, the majority cited Griggs as precedent and noted the similarities between Title VII,
which Griggs interpreted, and the ADEA.67 However, the dissent points out that Griggs was
decided after the ADEA had already become law, meaning that Congress could not have known
at the time that disparate impact cases would be allowed under either law.68 Congress could have
amended the ADEA following Griggs, expressly rejecting disparate impact liability, had it been
worried of a similar decision such as the one that arose in this case. It has not done so to date.
B. The RFOA Provision
As suggested above, the dissent's argument regarding the RFOA provision represents a
practicality argument as opposed to the purely logical argument raised by the majority. The
dissent's reading of the RFOA provision is best summarized by the notion that if there is no
reasonable factor other than age upon which the policy is based, the policy illegally discriminates
because the only possible factor left is age.69 In short, the dissent calls into doubt the existence
of facially neutral illegal policies. Policies which may appear facially neutral but that are not
justified by RFOAs are in practical terms not facially neutral; the "neutrality" and the claimed
"factors other than age" are mere pretext. A disparate impact theory of liability can reach and
prevent such discriminatory policies.
V. Analysis of the Court's Conclusions
The argument regarding whether disparate impact should apply in ADEA cases is largely
reducible to the majority's likening of Title VII to the ADEA7 ° and the dissent's reliance upon
the significance of the RFOA provision.71 Both arguments have strong elements. However, the
67Id. at 1541-43 (majority opinion).
68 Smith v. City of Jackson, 125 S.Ct. 1536, 1556 (2005) (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
69Id. at 1552 ("Reliance on an unreasonable nonage factor would indicate that the employer's explanation is, in fact,
no more than a pretext for intentional discrimination.") (emphasis in original).70Id. at 1540-46 (majority opinion).
71 Id. at 1552-56 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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dissent's rejection of the agency interpretation argument is poor; it is largely limited to the use of
one EEOC interpretation of the RFOA provision, with the conclusion that the interpretation does
not speak to the availability of disparate impact in ADEA cases.72 It does not address the claim of
the majority and concurrence that agencies have supported use of disparate impact in other
contexts73 and it presents no evidence of alternative agency interpretations. On the other hand,
the majority's decision regarding disparate impact, while perhaps correct in a purely logical
sense, is inefficient and will not likely result in a significant future impact on ADEA cases. In
some cases, it would be advantageous to immediately determine whether an RFOA exists. If so,
the case may be dismissed. However, given the decision in the Smith case, the RFOA question is
relegated to the later stages of a case.
Justice Scalia's concurrence, which heavily relies on agency interpretation, may be the
best argument of all. Further, though Smith may shift the burden to the defendant to prove that an
RFOA exists, the RFOA provision will remain a significant hurdle for plaintiffs in ADEA cases.
A good defense attorney will come prepared with several possible RFOAs, and given the typical
link between age and experience, a policy that discriminates based on experience can be an
effective way to "back-door" age discrimination. At best, Smith could help plaintiffs benefit from
state laws that are similar to the ADEA but which lack RFOA provisions, assuming that this case
leads to similar interpretations of those laws.
The focus on disparate impact in the case is surprising and disappointing, especially
given that it became the main question in the case. At its heart, this case is simply a rehashing of
Hazen Paper. As in that case, the plaintiffs here were harmed not because of their age, but
72 Id. at 1558 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1625.7(d), which stipulates that a policy is justified by
an RFOA when it is a "business necessity"). This regulation has since been overturned as too strict. Western Air
Lines, Inc. v. Criswell, 472 U.S. 400, 419 (1985). However, this alone does not necessarily mean that the RFOA
provision must foreclose the possible application of a disparate impact theory of liability under the ADEA.
71 Id. at 1547 (Scalia, J., concurring) (citations omitted).
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because of their experience.74 If a disparate impact theory of liability was not required to decide
Hazen Paper,75 as the majority suggests, it should not have been necessary in this case either.
Ultimately, given the Hazen Paper precedent, the verdict in this case was correct. However, the
majority and the Fifth Circuit76 (despite reaching a contrary view to the Supreme Court majority)
should both be faulted for taking it upon themselves to provide a legal interpretation of the
ADEA that was not required to decide the case and, indeed, was not even at issue. If the policy
in Hazen Paper was not facially neutral, than neither was the policy in Smith, meaning that
disparate impact should have played no part in this case. The question of whether disparate
impact should be allowed in ADEA cases should have been deferred to a future case in which it
was at issue.
74See Smith, 125 S.Ct. at 1539 (majority opinion)
71 See id. at 1544.
76 Smith v. City of Jackson, 351 F.3d 183, 186-88 (5th Cir. 2003).
Richmond Journal of aw and the Public Interest Winter/Sprinjz 2006
